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or years, I have been working on issues of informal-
ity. Yet these issues are often also branded as corrup-
tion. The research question whether the boundaries 
between the two can be drawn cannot be answered 
by means of definitions. Analytical distinctions prove useless in 
the face of practices embedded in particular sets of constraints, 
practical norms, and “moral economies”.1 If I am asked to give a 
one-word clue to identify the missing piece in the puzzle of cross-
ing boundaries between informality and corruption, I would say: 
ambivalence. In its sociological sense, ambivalence, according to 
the definition of Robert Merton, refers to incompatible normative 
expectations of attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. The incompat-
ibility is assigned to a status and the social structures that generate 
the circumstances in which ambivalence is embedded.2 The core 
type of sociological ambivalence puts contradictory demands 
upon the occupants of a status in a particular social relation. Since 
these norms cannot be simultaneously expressed in behavior, they 
come to be expressed in an oscillation of behaviors: of detachment 
and compassion, of discipline and permissiveness, of personal and 
impersonal treatment”.3
The bi-polar definition of ambivalence
In the context of modernity, ambivalence is associated with frag-
mentation and failure of manageability. Zygmunt Bauman defines 
ambivalence as the possibility of assigning an object or an event to 
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more than one category and views it as a language-specific disor-
der. The main symptom of disorder is the acute discomfort we feel 
when we are unable to read the situation properly and to choose 
between alternative actions.4 Bauman lists ambivalence among 
“the tropes of the ‘other’ of order: ambiguity, uncertainty, unpre-
dictability, illogicality, irrationality, ambivalence, brought about 
by modernity with its desire to organize and to design”.5 Ambiva-
lence thus implies a form of disorder and negativity.
In my view, ambivalence can be singled out from Bauman’s 
list for its bi-polarity, oscillating duality (both order and disorder; 
both positivity and negativity), and relative clarity of the polar po-
sitions. It is a social counterpart of emotional ambivalence in psy-
chology (love-hate) or materials with ambivalent qualities in phys-
ics (semiconductors). In other words, it is a situation of coexisting 
thesis and antithesis, without the possibility and certainty of their 
synthesis, yet without uncertainty as to what coexisting views, at-
titudes, and beliefs are. The latter qualification would not apply to 
ambivalence in psychoanalysis, where it is often associated with 
ambiguity. For the purposes of the following discussion of substan-
tive, functional, and normative ambivalence, I distinguish the con-
cept of ambivalence from ambiguity in the following ways:
O  Ambivalence is bi-polar, not multi-polar as is the case with am-
biguity.
O  The poles (thesis and anti-thesis) are clearly defined.
O  There is little uncertainty as to what coexisting views, attitudes, 
ECONOMIES  
OF FAVORS  
OR CORRUPT  
SOCIETIES? 
by Alena Ledeneva
Exploring the boundaries between informality and corruption
14
ILLUSTRATION: KARIN SUNVISSON
15
and beliefs are. The uncertainty is created by the unpredictabil-
ity of their actualization.
O  The incompatibility of constituents of the ambivalence is differ-
ent from duplicity, from the deliberate deceptiveness in behav-
ior or speech, or from double-dealing.
O  When molded by the clashing constraints, ambivalence can 
result in the capacity for doublethink (the illogical logic), dual 
functionality (functionality of the dysfunctional), and double 
standards (for us and for them).
O  The ambivalence is best understood through the paradoxes it 
produces, such as the role of hackers in advancing cyber secu-
rity, for example, and can be identified by looking into the open 
secrets of societies.6
Blat
My interest in the theme of ambivalence originated in a study of 
blat; the use of personal networks for getting things done in Soviet 
Russia, or Russia’s “economy of favors”.7 The latter referred not 
only to the circulation of favors — favors of access to the centrally 
distributed goods, services and privileges — but also to the sociabil-
ity of blat channels, which friends and friends of friends routinely 
used for tackling shortages and problems. The pervasiveness of 
blat turned favors into an alternative currency of “mutual help 
and mutual understanding” needed for the functioning of the non-
market economy, and embodied peoples’ frustration with the non-
consumerist ideology and political constraints of the centralized 
planning and distribution. On the individual level, favors delivered 
by friends, acquaintances, and friends of friends granted solutions 
to small-time problems. On a societal level, they represented a way 
out for the Soviet system that struggled to adhere to its own pro-
claimed principles. A discreet redistribution of resources within 
social networks — an implicit social contract, known as the “little 
deal” — became part of the solution.8
The contradictory nature of constraints, and informal practices 
needed to resolve them, are well reflected in the anecdote about 
six paradoxes of socialism:
O  No unemployment but nobody works.
O  Nobody works but productivity increases.
O  Productivity increases but shops are empty.
O  Shops are empty but fridges are full.
O  Fridges are full but nobody is satisfied.
O  Nobody is satisfied but all vote unanimously.
Each of these paradoxes hides a reference to an informal prac-
tice that helped the Soviet system to continue making its formal 
claims of superiority, yet also undermined the declared principles.
A Russian phrase “nel’zya, no mozhno” (prohibited, yet pos-
sible) offered a summary understanding of the Soviet society with 
its all-embracing restrictions and the labyrinth of possibilities 
around them (the shops are empty but fridges are full). Blat was 
an open secret for insiders, but a puzzle for outsiders unequipped 
to handle the “doublethink” associated with blat. It was not that a 
formal “no” necessarily turned into a “yes” after pulling some blat 
strings. The formula no+blat=yes is misleading, for it emphasizes 
the importance of blat but downplays the importance of con-
straints. In Soviet times, even outsiders could make useful friends 
and mobilize them and their networks to get things done. Yet 
there was always a limit to what friends could do. Sometimes blat 
worked and sometimes it didn’t. Thus, its formula should grasp 
both ends of the paradox:
blat=no (shops are empty)
AND
blat=yes (fridges are full)
Blat and shortage
No coherent rules about blat economy of favors, which were pre-
dominantly associated with access to goods and services in short 
supply, could be deduced: it was both the formally prescribed 
“no” and the informally pushed “yes” that constituted an ambiva-
lent outcome, somewhat dependent on the size and potential of 
the networks, while also being constraint-driven, context-bound, 
uncertain, and irregular. Moreover, under conditions of shortage 
(or rationing), a positive outcome for one was preconditioned by 
negative outcomes for the others. While the state monopoly of 
centralized distribution created shortages, the monopolization of 
blat redistribution by each particular gatekeeper further perpetu-
ated these shortages further. The constraints of socialism drove 
people to outwit the centralized distribution system. At the same 
time, the harshness of these constraints made it impossible for 
the regime to fully enforce the existing regulations, which created 
opportunities for brokers to circumvent them. “Pushers” of con-
straints (tolkachi and blatmeisters) created value for themselves 
and their networks at the expense of less opportunistic players. 
Thus, functionally, blat softened the constraints of the Soviet 
system for some but was dependent on the continuing existence 
of constraints for others. Working with constraints to unleash 
their enabling power became the preoccupation of experienced 
brokers, who often functioned for the sake of the Soviet system 
but contrary to the system’s own rules. Thus blat could function in 
both productive and non-productive ways.
Informal practices that  
make things work
Obtaining goods and services through blat channels provided 
just one example of the many informal practices that made the 
Soviet regime more tolerable and, at the same time, helped to 
undermine its political, economic, and social foundations. In his 
Economics of Shortage, Janos Kornai theorizes principles of ration-
ing, or the non-price criteria of allocation, and forms of allocation 
of resources.9 Each of these can be associated with an informal 
practice, serving specific needs at various stages in socialist devel-
opment. For example, associated with queuing is the practice of 
absenteeism from a workplace (no unemployment, but nobody 
works), that in late socialism served people’s consumption, but 
also served to alleviate the hardship of queuing and to reduce criti-
cism towards the regime, which was incapable of tackling short-
ages. Because absenteeism had utility for late socialism and could 
not be ruled out completely, it was prosecuted by authorities 
only in selective campaigns, often to signal that the practice had 
gone out of proportion or to punish regional and local officials, on 
whose territories the raids for absentees in the shops’ queues were 
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der which everyone has to live is often referred to as “sistema”.
What it lacks in democratic graces, the sistema appears to 
compensate for with the effectiveness of its informal incentives, 
control, and capital flows operated by power networks and their 
impressive capacity to mobilize. Reliance on networks enables 
leaders to mobilize and to control, yet they also lock politicians, 
bureaucrats, and businessmen into informal deals, mediated in-
terests, and personalized loyalties. This is the “modernization trap 
of informality”: one cannot use the potential of informal networks 
without triggering their negative long-term consequences for insti-
tutional development.12
The similarity of functional ambivalence of both blat and power 
networks points to an important dimension of modernization: 
in order to modernize, one should not only change the formal 
rules, but also modernize networks. Modernizing networks in the 
context of informality and corruption first of all means changing 
people’s attitudes to favors of access for “svoi” at all levels. Net-
works through which favors are channeled, and their functional 
ambivalence, are essential for the understanding of economies of 
favors and their similarities with and differences from corruption.
Helping from whose pocket?
In the Soviet economy of favors, favors often involved redistribu-
tion of public (or non-personal) resources for the provision of 
personalized help, which placed such actions on the borderline 
with practices of embezzlement, pilfering, and routine misuse of 
resources. Yet the societal constraints, specifically the illegitimacy 
of the private property, legitimized the use of the public property. 
Blat favors were commonly aimed at obtaining food, goods, and 
services, to which people were entitled. It made such favors easier 
to receive, especially that they were associated with non-monetary 
incentives. Moreover, the sense of entitlement provided legitimacy 
to those involved in giving, receiving, or exchanging favors. Those 
who did not or could not become involved, however, emphasized 
the inequality and unfairness of blat. For participants, favors of 
access merged with patterns of care and sociability to such an 
extent that people were often unable to distinguish, for example, 
friendship from the use of friendship. Such dual nature of blat was 
preconditioned by subjective and objective, informal and formal 
constraints. The informal code of friendship in socialist societies 
(to give away your last shirt to a friend) made the boundaries be-
tween relationship and the use of relationship blurred. The formal 
constraints of socialism — where the public and private property 
balance was distorted, the money did not function fully, and the 
alternative currencies of exchange created symbiotic relationship 
with the economy of shortage — allowed favors of access to be 
exchanged at the expense of the public resources and served to 
compensate for the deficiencies of the centralized system of distri-
bution.
The blurred boundaries between  
sociability and instrumentality
For the purpose of the ideal types, it is possible to establish a 
borderline to distinguish between friendship and blat (the use 
of friendship) — if help to a friend comes from one’s own pocket, 
made. Selective enforcement, or under-enforcement, became the 
obverse of over-regulation.
The theme of ambivalence became similarly central for the 
postcommunist transition. In my next book, How Russia Really 
Works, I argue against the stigmatization of practices that replaced 
blat during Russia’s dramatic break-up with its communist past. 
Contrary to the assumption that informal practices had to disap-
pear once the oppressive system collapsed, I identified new prac-
tices that emerged and functioned ambivalently in order to serve 
the transition: they both supported and subverted the post-Soviet 
political, judicial, and economic institutions. Newly established in 
the 1990s, democratic and market institutions, including competi-
tive elections, free media, an independent judiciary, and private 
property rights, became enveloped in informal practices that both 
facilitated their development and undermined it. Practices associ-
ated with manipulation of electoral campaigns (black public rela-
tions or piar), misuse of information and compromising materials 
(kompromat), use of informal control and leverage (krugovaya 
poruka) in the formally independent judiciary, circumvention of 
market-induced economic constraints with barter schemes, non-
transparent ownership, and creative accounting were the most 
widespread in that period. 10
Blat and sistema
My initial theorization of the ambivalent role of blat networks has 
also helped in the subsequent exploration of the network-based 
system of informal governance — sistema — under Putin. In peri-
ods of stability, the ambivalent workings of blat networks at the 
grassroots level are indeed similar to those of power networks in 
sistema, but one important distinction has to be emphasized. If the 
blat “economy of favors” had to some extent an equalizing effect 
on the chances of gaining access to resources for networked indi-
viduals, and thus reduced the privilege gap between insiders and 
outsiders of the centralized distribution system, the trickle-down 
effect of the present-day “economy of kickbacks” seems to be the 
reverse: it undermines competition, excludes the outsiders, and 
rewards insiders through network-based allocation and mobiliza-
tion. If blat networks tended to operate on the basis of obligation 
perceived as “mutual help”, power networks tend to operate on 
the basis of a hierarchical, patron–client logic, associated with 
practices of “feeding” (kormlenie) aimed to enhance the power of 
the ruler and leave his subordinates under his “manual control”.11 
This difference also stems from the political and economic frame-
works in which networks operate. Because the Soviet system was 
not economically viable due to its centralization, rigid ideologi-
cal constraints, shortages, and the limited role of money, blat 
networks had some equalizing, “weapon of the weak” role in the 
oppressive conditions, and to some extent served the economic 
needs of the central distribution system. In Putin’s Russia, power 
networks operate without those constraints and extract multiple 
benefits from the post-Soviet reforms, while undermining the key 
principles of market competition (equality of economic subjects 
and security of property rights) and the key principle of the rule of 
law (equality before the law). They are, in effect, the “weapon of 
the strong”. The effect of dominance, omnipresence, pressure un-
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it is help of a friend, if a help to a friend comes at the expense or 
through redistribution of public resources, it is a favor of access. 
The nature of formal constraints, the lack of private property or 
clear divisions between the public and the private in socialist soci-
eties, provides a degree of entitlement to whatever the economy 
of favors has to offer. As opposed to favors given, received, or 
exchanged at the expense of personal resources, an economy 
of favors implies that a favor-giver is not only a giver but also a 
gatekeeper or a broker benefiting from the position of access and 
discretionary powers. It is also often the case that a favor-recipient 
is not merely a beneficiary of a redistributed object or service, 
one delivered by a friend, a friend of a friend or a broker, but also 
a recipient of what s/he is entitled to have. In other words, a favor 
does not produce an outcome visibly different from that achieved 
in other ways (inheriting, rationing, queuing, purchasing on the 
black market), which makes defining the boundaries even more 
difficult.
To complicate matters further, the difference between socia-
bility and instrumentality is defined not only by the source of 
resources (private or public) but also by the incentive (material 
or non-material). Thus, the intermediation of blat is essential to 
protect one’s positive and altruistic self-image and to misrecognize 
one’s own experiences: one helps a friend, not oneself, and that 
friend returns a favor eventually. Both parties maintain a “good 
friend” self-image while using public resources for “non-selfish” 
purposes. When the moral norms prescribe that one must help a 
friend but also that blat is immoral and unethical, the normative 
ambivalence — the partial “misrecognition game” — is the way out.
Selfless redistribution of public funds for a moral cause is not 
likely to be seen as self-serving, or corrupt. And yet, where there is 
a potential for mutuality, sociability breeds instrumentality. Self-
lessness of favors, or disinterested giving, is an essential feature 
of an economy of favors: “I favor your interests, you favor mine, 
and we are both selfless individuals not interested in material 
gain.” Acting sociably, for a non-material and/or non-personal 
gain, allows the giver not to cross the borderline of a corrupt ex-
change, while the recipient of material gain is not in the position 
to re-direct public resources and technically does nothing wrong. 
Where a “favor of access” involves the misuse of public office, the 
self-image is “rescued” from being corrupt by an altruistic incen-
tive and the lack of direct private gain.
In turn, non-material incentives may include all kinds of moral 
or emotional gains and losses. Apart from grace, noted by Julian 
Pitt-Rivers13 and Humphrey14, dignity and humiliation can certain-
ly be brought into the discussion of non-material incentives. In 
literary sources, Eric Naiman observes, they seem to under-
gird just about every act of giving and receiving, and the 
recipient’s sense of self-worth (dignity) and the degree 
of resentment he experiences, even — and perhaps 
especially — towards those who do the most for him, 
are essential components in the understanding of the 
meaning and consequences of any favor. The sense of 
daily frustration surrounding the material aspects of 
much late-Soviet life surely had an impact on the giving and 
receiving of favors, and their perception.
Clashing constraints beyond socialism
As mentioned in the introduction, the issues of blurred boundar-
ies and clashing constraints are not exclusive to socialism15 or post-
socialism. In a wider sense, such issues can be reframed in terms 
of world religions, the emergence of an anonymous individual, 
market systems, or the transformation from limited access to open 
access societies, a transformation that implies that certain hurdles 
of law enforcement and limitations for the elites need to be over-
come.16 In a narrower sense, in order to understand the contexts 
conducive to economies of favors, one should find oneself in a 
situation, where due to its formal and informal constraints, it is 
impossible to be a good brother and a good bureaucrat simulta-
neously, or where it is possible for a favor to have contradictory 
outcomes (good for one, bad for another; good in the short term, 
bad in the long run; to alleviate but also to aggravate shortages). 
The clashing constraints certainly reinforce the functional ambiva-
lence of social networks, which operate differently under different 
constraints and certainly play a key role in mastering mutually 
exclusive constraints.
When gate keeping is associated with a position in official hi-
erarchy (with access to public resources), granting a favor is not 
defined by personal choice. It is shaped by the dual pressure on 
a bureaucrat: on the one hand, formal responsibility to perform 
certain duties and follow rules according to organizational or pro-
fessional code, delegated by the principal, and on the other hand, 
informal responsibility for personal networks, friends, family, and 
the peer pressure of the social circle. A cross-country variation in 
the combinations of formal and informal constraints is substantial. 
There are societies where it is possible to be a good bureaucrat and 
a good brother at the same time, but there are societies where this 
is not possible, and one has to navigate around both sets of con-
straints in order to keep both the job and the network. Economies 
of favors tend to develop in circumstances of conflicting formal 
and informal constraints, so that social networks not only become 
instrumental for individuals but also ease the workings of institu-
tions.
Favors of access in other societies
I argue that constraints associated with central planning, short-
ages, and rationing produce an “economy of favors” that is essen-
tial for the functioning of political, economic, and social systems, 
and thus is different in scale and functionality from other systems. 
Some pointers to such conditions are hidden in a popular proverb 
“do not have hundred rubles, have hundred friends”. It is meant 
to emphasize the non-material (moral and emotional) 
importance of relationships, but it has also developed 
connotations involving access to goods and services 
in short supply. In the planned economy, money 
played a limited role because of the underdeveloped 
markets, which placed additional emphasis on the 
non-market transactions. But this does not mean 
that the informal dimension disappears with the 
collapse of planned centralized economies. In devel-
oped market economies, favors for circumventing the 
existing constraints are also both relationship-based 
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and instrumental,17 yet it is the nature of constraints that makes a 
difference. Although the concept of “favor of access” has emerged 
from the context of state-centralized distribution systems, it may 
become relevant in other types of regimes where the state plays a 
central role in the bailout of private financial institutions (the 2008 
financial crisis in Russia has certainly put businesses in a queue for 
a bailout). In full-fledged markets, as portrayed by Jeremy Rifkin18, 
the institution of ownership gradually transforms into the life-long 
access to services, so one can envisage the relevance of economies 
of favors for access to nearly every aspect of human life.
Whether driven by scarcity or surplus, there are pockets of 
society where friends, friends of friends, and other gatekeepers 
capable of sharing access are all-important, and where favors of 
access are routinely provided and channeled by social networks. 
It can be envisaged as a social network of gatekeepers, who either 
open their gates of access when needed by those they care about, 
or use their own time and resources for sociability, thus also creat-
ing or maintaining their social networks. The hidden part of such 
sociability is its potential to generate a return, to create incentives 
for keeping the gates shut unless there is a prospect of a return, 
and to generate divisions into “us” and “them”, thus entailing ex-
clusion and unfairness.
The blurred boundaries between favors 
of access and corrupt transactions
The resemblance of blat favors aimed at circumventing formal 
rules and procedures — manipulating access to resources through 
direct purchase as in bribery or the diversion of public resources 
for personal gain — makes them a member of a wider family of 
informal practices and complicates the matter of drawing the 
boundaries between favors and corrupt exchanges.19 It also raises 
the question whether blat was in fact a dysfunctional corrupt prac-
tice. This may be the case in certain contexts but it is also mislead-
ing, for neither blat nor corruption have a clear or single mean-
ing, nor are these terms independent of normative, context-free 
judgment.20 According to Lampert21, cases of corruption have a 
ranking specific to the society. The Soviets clearly felt that bribery 
was a worse form of corruption than a small-scale use of public re-
sources for private ends (such as using workers to do private jobs). 
Cultural connotations of money as “dirty” made non-monetary 
transactions fairly legitimate.22 This was in tune with the distinc-
tion drawn between various forms of offense in the criminal code 
and the different penalties for engaging in them.23 Blat was not 
on the criminal scale at all and could not, 
strictly speaking, be characterized as 
illegal (by reason of its small scale 
or acknowledged necessity (voiti 
v polozhenie)), thus falling in the 
category of “good” or “ambigu-
ous” corruption.24 The oppressive 
nature of the communist regime, and 
its centralized way of distributing goods 
and privileges, introduces another twist 
in interpretation of the nature of blat 
practices: if blat corrupted the corrupt 
regime, can we refer to it as corruption? With these considerations 
in mind, to equate blat and corruption in a Soviet context is to mis-
understand the nature of Soviet socialism.
It is tempting to argue that blat subverted the Soviet system, 
and thus should be held responsible for undermining its principles 
and foundations, leading to the ultimate collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Yet blat also served the needs of the socialist system, and 
thus supported its existence, operating contrary to the system’s 
own acclaimed principles. Such functionality of the dysfunctional, 
or ambivalence, applies, for example, to the role of hackers in 
advancing cyber security.25 Apart from the ambivalent relationship 
(subversive/supportive) with the Soviet institutions, blat produced 
a similar bearing on personal relationships — people were forced 
to use their personal networks instrumentally, and that instru-
mentality helped to sustain those networks. People were made to 
want to be “needed”: blat is certainly missed by former blat meis-
ters these days, and babushki mind being replaced by professional 
babysitters. The ambivalence of social networks is an interesting 
angle to explore as it helps identify similarities and differences in 
those conditions that make people use their networks for getting 
things done in different societies.
For example, patron-client networks are known for their 
parasitism on state resources and abuse of administrative power 
everywhere. Yet in Russia, they are perceived as more stifling for 
business than in China (this line of argument links to Robert Klit-
gaard’s conception of an “optimal level” of corruption, which has 
been taboo in contemporary anti-corruption studies).26 Chinese 
networks are monitored better (there is a system of checks and 
balances, hotlines, and letters that are taken seriously by the Com-
munist Party) and may be managed internally with more aware-
ness of guanxi.27 Chinese regions enjoy much more independence 
than Russian ones, and that also has implications for local growth, 
rather than centralization of resources. Cultural and historical dif-
ferences are also important: a sense of measure is a key Confucian 
value that can be contrasted with the Russian soul’s aversion to 
moderation.
Crossing the boundaries with a smile
The blat exchanges of early socialism have matured into a full-
fledged economy of favors and become an open secret of late 
socialism, alongside its other competences: “to read between 
the lines”, “to see through the façade”, “to beat the system”, that 
enabled the reproduction of daily interactions without pressure 
of recognition of one’s own compromised behavior or the failures 
of the system. It allowed people to get on with their daily lives and 
helped the system to reproduce itself. A society of double stan-
dards and open secrets was thus formed.
Although the social competence of handling open secrets, and 
dealing with situations of moral ambiguity or ethical squeeze are 
largely invisible to outsiders, I argue that the normative ambiva-
lence can be spotted in what I call a “knowing smile”.28 I have seen 
many of these while researching the economy of favors. Knowing 
smiles are partially about smiling, partially about knowing; partial-
ly about knowing, partially about not knowing yet being able to go 
on without questioning. A knowing smile signals the competence 
lecture
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that includes a certain degree of cynicism, tacit knowledge about 
what is normal, the so-called ability “to go on”, enhanced by skills 
of doublethink, misrecognition, and the ability to turn formal con-
straints to one’s advantage. A knowing smile implies ambivalence 
about the idea of being honest, upright, and dedicated to official 
goals, holding these values, while also maintaining a distance from 
them. Independence, individualism, civic rights in totalitarian so-
cieties are channeled through doublethink. “Someone who read-
ily believes whatever official discourse says has no independent 
thought”.29
The knowing smile — whether as a sign of recognition, mis-
recognition, or both — indicates some release from the grip of 
totalitarian ideologies, which are aimed at the transformation of 
human nature30, yet it could also be seen as a sign of such trans-
formation. It becomes irrelevant whether people believed official 
ideological messages or not. Instead, the relation to the official-
dom became based on intricate strategies of simulated support 
and on “nonofficial” practices.31 Individual doublethink develops 
into collective double standards that imply the ability to hold 
contradictory views in private and in public and the capacity to 
switch between them smoothly, when applied to “us” and “them”, 
to “ordinary citizens” and to the Party leaders, to one’s personal 
circle and to society as a whole. Double standards continued to 
dominate in the post-Soviet era.
When I did my fieldwork in Russia in the 1990s and asked 
people to talk to me about blat — Russia’s economy of favors — they 
smiled knowingly but then almost universally responded, “Why 
ask me?” Reassured that I only want to know “what everybody 
knows”, most of my respondents were happy to discuss blat mat-
ters frankly, talking mostly about others, or about the way things 
used to be, but eventually also coming up with personal stories. 
An understanding of the misrecognition game and the ambivalence 
of my respondents has informed my methodology of research on 
favors: speak about generic practice, not personal experience; let 
the experience trickle down through narrative; speak about others 
(neighbors, other firms, friends); speak about the past, and inquire 
about know-how that is no longer in use.
Ambivalent methodology
It would seem that one cannot study societies’ open secrets with 
a straightforward tackle. Approaching sensitive subjects requires 
an observant and patient researcher, keen on details and willing 
to take detours. Detours are in fact essential and are not without 
paradoxes. One should not look for it to find it; one should go at a 
distance to see closer; one should use the “rear mirror” to move 
ahead; and one should get out in order to notice what was in. In 
other words, the most direct way of studying sensitive subjects is 
to study them indirectly. One of the side effects of researching an 
economy of favors is that one becomes unfit to participate in it: 
once its misrecognition game is analyzed, it becomes impossible 
to play it, once its ambivalence is understood, the habitual use of 
double standards becomes inhibited. Reflection distorts practice.
Studying economies of favors allows one to assess the most 
profound features of societies through seemingly trivial aspects of 
everyday behavior, but it requires methodologies for grasping am-
bivalence. Sensitivities displayed in people’s accounts and expla-
nations of favors provide insights into their own view of the divi-
sive nature of favors and the double standards surrounding them, 
as well as into relationships within their networks. Understanding 
such cleavages can be hugely assisted by fortuitous historical cir-
cumstances. In the beginning of the 1990s, for example, it became 
possible to ask people to articulate their views on the Soviet past 
without constraint, just as in the 1950s, those who left the Soviet 
Union were able to describe their blat experience in the Harvard 
Interviewing Project. The collapse of the Soviet Union has made 
blat a matter of the past and thus enabled people to articulate it.32 
Yet asking people about private matters, such as favors, will always 
take them out of their comfort zone.
Years of fieldwork in post-Soviet Russia has helped me to de-
velop a “slow cooking” methodology and assemble ethnographic 
evidence on hidden aspects of informality, strategies of misrecog-
nition, and ambivalent qualities of economies of favors alongside 
other qualitative research. I relied on people’s willingness to share 
their experiences and started framing the most interesting ones as 
case studies. When I was researching Russia’s Economy of Favors, 
it was a case of a doctor, Natalia, who was an effective blat broker, 
exploiting the system but also being exploited by it. Her story 
exemplified the experience of the inner workings the Soviet econ-
omy of favors at the grassroots level. In How Russia Really Works, it 
was the story of a banker, Tatiana, that best illustrated the ambiva-
lence of the business practices of the 1990s, with their criminality, 
unlawfulness, and unfairness, on the one hand, and their func-
tionality for the transition, on the other.33 As I looked for a story 
to illustrate the profound changes that have taken place in Russia 
in 2000–2008, I knew it should be associated with the increased 
importance of the judiciary and Russia’s integration into the in-
ternational legal order. I was particularly keen to explore gender 
aspects — the majority of judges are women — and their relevance 
to the analysis of the key feature of sistema. The first decade of the 
twenty-first century produced a “whistle-blowing” trend among 
the Russian judiciary, with a number of judges speaking out about 
the fear they felt and the administrative pressure they had expe-
rienced. Several judges testified went on record to report that, at 
a higher level, influence with judges and prosecutors can yield 
desired results in criminal, commercial, and civil trials, and that, 
even if unfavorable judgments are handed down, there are ways to 
ensure that they are not enforced. When Olga Kudeshkina was dis-
missed from her position as a judge in the Moscow City Court for 
her non-compliance with informal commands, she took her case 
to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and won.34 
Her life story has become the case study for Can Russia Moder-
nise,35 illustrating the constraints that turn a “whistleblower” of 
sistema defects into a “traitor”.36
Knowing password for open secrets
In my ethnographic fieldwork, I have searched for signs of recog-
nition of matters one does not need to spell out: the semi-taboos 
about economies of favors, the complicity in leaving things 
unarticulated, the ambivalence of attitudes towards sensitive 
subjects. These are all pointers to potentially innovative research. 
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A smile is a promise. A tacit agreement within shared knowledge.
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Observing the near ubiquitous exchange of knowing smiles in ev-
eryday contexts has pointed me to the niches of informality. Such 
exchanges form the basis of normality and routine interaction 
that are so fundamental for the modus operandi of societies, ac-
cording to Goffman.37 Smiling about blat has prompted me to look 
at other open secrets and their intricate relationship to power.38 
I argue that economies of favors constitute the societies’ open 
secrets. One might think that an open secret is not a secret at all, 
since it concerns things that “everyone knows”, whether within 
a particular group or more widely in a society. This view would 
mistaken, however, because open secrets are only partly open. 
Open secrets are secrets in the sense that they are excluded from 
formal or official discourse but they are open in the sense that they 
are familiar and referred to in idioms and language games, though 
these often require explanation for outsiders. Their ambivalence 
is a real and significant one. There is a tacit acceptance that what is 
known should remain unarticulated. Open secrets, as is certainly 
the case with double standards, occupy areas of tension, where a 
public affirmation of knowledge would threaten other values or 
goods that those involved want to protect. This point is noted in 
Georg Simmel’s discussion of secrecy, which reveals its complexity 
and subtlety. Simmel defines secrecy as “consciously willed con-
cealment” — open secrets are clearly still secrets according to this 
definition.
From ethnography to the next  
generation of indicators
As societies’ open secrets, economies of favor have great research 
potential in most societies. The “oblique” methodology outlined 
above fits with the logic of triangulation: “attempt to map out, or 
explain more fully, the richness and complexity of human behav-
ior by studying it from more than one standpoint”.39 Qualitative 
data on economies of favors should ideally be supported by other 
methods of “cross-checking data from multiple sources to search 
for regularities in the research data”.40 However, there are inevi-
table obstacles to the study of ambivalence, whether substantive, 
functional, or normative.
Quantitatively, the size of economies of favors is even harder 
to assess than that of non-quantifiable forms of corruption, such 
as nepotism, conflict of interest, or hospitality.41 The subjectiv-
ity of value of favors, their cross-cultural incomparability, and 
ambivalence make it impossible to measure the size of economies 
of favors objectively. Rather, one could assess a spread of the phe-
nomenon, following the methodology of measuring perception, as 
in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI).42 It should also be pos-
sible to measure the gap between the perception of others’ use of 
favors and self-reported experience of giving and receiving favors. 
Given that perceptions of favors are ambivalent and experience 
is misrecognized, risks of quantification can be mitigated by a tri-
angulation that gives a more detailed and balanced picture of the 
situation. Given cultural specificity of economies of favors — there 
are often no exact translations of related idioms, slang, or jargon 
from one language to another — qualitative research is essential to 
establish the facilitating conditions, main gatekeepers, principles 
of inclusion and exclusion, multiplicity of norms, needs satisfied, 
degrees of obligation and codification, influence of kinship, tradi-
tion and religion, social inequality and other divisive narratives. 
The main challenge, however, is to create novel indicators for the 
“immeasurable” that would grasp ambivalence, misrecognition, 
doublethink, and double standards, and that could potentially be 
comparable across societies.43
Comparability of economies of favors can be seriously contest-
ed. Due to their substantive ambivalence, they are hard to study 
even within one setting (specificity, secretive nature, dependence 
on respondents). They are inscribed into formal frameworks — 
political and economic systems — which are themselves non-com-
parable and rooted in different historical/social contexts.44 Due 
to their functional ambivalence, they both subvert and support 
political and economic systems, social norms, and standards of 
sociability. Due to the normative ambivalence towards favors, the 
collected data may be difficult to interpret. Rather than following 
a coherent set of principles, the provision of favors is in line with 
some but contrary to the other widely held norms and values, 
which causes the ambivalence with which it is regarded: it is  
usually condoned by some and condemned by others, and/or 
condoned and condemned by the same people, depending on 
context. It takes an ethnographic and, possibly, interdisciplinary 
approach to identify an ambivalent subject, such as an economy 
of favors, but further research and comparison cannot be fully de-
veloped without the disciplinary methods, integrating the angle of 
ambivalence and adapting to it. ≈
Note: This article is based on a keynote speech held at the conference 
“Beyond Transition: New Directions in Eastern and Central European 
Studies”,  October 2–4, 2013, in Lund. The lecture was recorded by  
Mi Lennhag, and revised by the author after transcription.45
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